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ARTICLE
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN EXPERT TESTIMONY
Dr. Wells Mangrum† and Professor Richard Collin Mangrum††
I. INTRODUCTION
In early American common law, courts permitted experts to testify only if
the opinion would be helpful to the trier of fact, narrowly interpreting that
scope.1 Some courts in the nineteenth century permitted expert testimony if
it would be helpful on such things as the authorship of handwriting.2 In the
area of medical testimony, the Iowa Supreme Court in 1919 refused to permit
a physician to explain that an x-ray or “skiagraph” depicted “a curvature of
the spine,” holding, under the original writing rule, that the document speaks
for itself.3 In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in Frye v. United States,4 became the first court to adopt a more
analytical approach to expert testimony. This approach became known as the
Frye standard of “general acceptance” for expert testimony:

† B.A. 2001; Harvard University; M.D. 2005, Mayo Medical School; Radiology
Residency 2010, Duke University; Neuroradiology Fellowship 2011, Duke University.
†† Yossem Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law; B.A. 1972, Harvard
University; J.D. 1975, University of Utah School of Law; B.C.L., 1978, Oxford University;
S.J.D., 1983, Harvard University School of Law.
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
2. Marcy v. Barnes, 82 Mass. 161 (1860).
It is a general rule, that the court is to determine in the first instance, upon the
evidence produced, whether the witness offered is qualified by his peculiar skill,
knowledge and experience in any particular art or employment, to testify as to
his opinion as an expert; and unless the evidence upon which the determination
to allow the witness to testify in that manner is reported, the decision is not open
to revision in another court.
Id. at 164. See also President of Quinsigamond Bank v. Hobbs, 77 Mass. 250, 257 (1858) (“The
authorities show that Southgate’s testimony, that in his opinion all the words in the note in
suit were written at the same time, was within the legal province of an expert.”); Recent Case,
Evidence-Expert Testimony-Age of Handwriting, 13 HARV. L. REV. 691 (1900) (“It seems a
better doctrine to allow the trial judge to determine in each particular case whether the jury
would be legitimately helped by an expert’s opinion.”).
3. Lang v. Marshalltown, 170 N.W. 463, 464-65 (Iowa 1919) (“[W]e are of the opinion
that the court erred in permitting the doctor to testify to what appeared in the skiagraph”
(quoting Elzig v. Bales, 112 N. W. 540, 541 (Iowa 1907))).
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.5
Following the Frye case, most courts adopted the Frye standard of “general
acceptability” for admitting expert testimony. Excepting “novel” expert
testimony that had not acquired “general acceptability” amongst the relevant
scientific community, courts were now permitted to admit expert testimony
subject to the crucibles of cross-examination, rebuttal expert testimony, and
closing arguments.6 However, the Frye standard began receiving criticism for
providing a basis to exclude some expert testimony that may assist the trier
of fact. 7
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 Several of the
newly-enacted rules addressed the issue of the admissibility of expert
testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 broadly permitted expert
testimony if the testimony would “help the trier of fact,”9 leaving unanswered
whether the Frye standard of “general acceptability” remained as the
threshold standard for what it meant to “help the trier of fact.”
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 703 authorized experts, for the first time, to
rely upon inadmissible evidence in forming their opinions “[i]f experts in the
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an
opinion on the subject.”10

5. Id. at 1014.
6. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general acceptance’ in
the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in the country
which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.”).
7. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (“Some criticism has been directed at
the Frye standard, primarily on the ground that the test is too conservative, often resulting in
the prevention of the admission of relevant evidence.”).
8. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (The United States
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2072, in which Congress delegated to the judicial branch the
authority to promulgate rules related to the procedures of the federal courts. The Supreme
Court attempted to enact the Federal Rules of Evidence under The Rules Enabling Act, but
Congress refused and instead enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute in 1975.).
9. FED. R. EVID. 702.
10. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(18) created an important hearsay
exception especially designed for experts to include statements contained in
a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on
cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct
examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the
expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or
by judicial notice.
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not
received as an exhibit.11
Notwithstanding the statutory changes related to expert testimony, the
courts were confused about the standard for admissibility for expert
testimony. Many federal courts interpreted Rule 702 as adopting the old
common law Frye standard of “general acceptability.”12 Other courts and
commentators suggested that the Frye standard had serious flaws and should
only be one of many factors considered in admitting expert testimony.13
Some courts and commentators suggested that the Frye standard unduly
restricted the admissibility of expert testimony.14 On the opposite end, some
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
12. Andrea A. Moenssens, Requiem for the “General Acceptance” Standard in Forensic
Science, in LEGAL MEDICINE 275, 279-80 (Cyril H. Wecht ed. 1982).
13. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
[T]he Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has proved to be too malleable
to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making envisioned by
some of its proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form the general acceptance
standard reflects a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific
evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. For these reasons, we conclude that “general acceptance in
the particular field to which [a scientific technique] belongs,” . . . should be
rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility. Accordingly,
we hold that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the
scientific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
admissibility; it is, however, one factor that a district court normally should
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the technique.
Id. See also State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); United States v. Smith,
736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24
(Cal. 1984) (en banc).
14. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Unless an exaggerated
popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to
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legal and scientific scholars began to express concern over “junk science”15
readily being admitted in trials under the too-permissive Frye standard.16
Other commentators suggested that admissibility under Rule 702 should be
analyzed under the civil preponderance standard for civil cases and the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for expert evidence offered against the
accused.17 Uncertainty prevailed on what changes, if any, the newly enacted
Federal Rules of Evidence required for expert testimony.
Everything changed dramatically in 1993 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.18 In Daubert,
parents, on behalf of infants, sued a pharmaceutical company to recover for
birth defects allegedly caused by the mother’s ingestion of a “morning
sickness” pill marketed under the name, “Bendectin.”19 The plaintiffs
presented the testimony of eight qualified experts who each based their
opinions that Bendectin presented a risk factor for birth defects based upon
the unpublished “reanalysis” of previously-published human statistical
studies.20 The trial and appellate court excluded the expert testimony related
to the proffered general causation theory on the basis that the theory of
causation did not meet Frye’s “generally accepted” theory of admissibility.
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court and decided several
issues that have controlled the admissibility of expert testimony in the federal
mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.”);
see also United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“The Frye test of general
acceptance . . . precludes too much relevant evidence . . . .”); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d
431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (“Every useful new development must have its first day in court. And
court records are full of the conflicting opinions of doctors, engineers, and accountants, to
name just a few of the legions of expert witnesses.”).
15. Kenneth Cheesbro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1637, 1693-96 (1993).
16. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 636-37;
Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 357, 367-68 (1989); Frederick B. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS 254, 265
(1984) (Frye jurisdictions will always lag behind advances in science); Joseph G. Petrosinelli,
Note & Comment, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79 GEO. L.J. 313,
317 (1990).
17. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1248-50 (1980) (criminal defendant and civil
litigants should be required to establish the validity of the scientific principle or technique by
a preponderance of the evidence; the prosecution in a criminal trial should be required to
prove validity beyond a reasonable doubt).
18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19. Id. at 582.
20. Id. at 583.
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courts and most state courts ever since.21 First, the Court clearly held that
Rule 702 did not adopt Frye’s “generally accepted” standard for
admissibility.22 Second, under a combination of the relevancy standard
contained in Rule 402 and the expert standard contained in Rule 702, the
Court determined that the trial court has a “gatekeeping” responsibility to
“ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.”23 The Court explained that
in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not
is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment,
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56.24
Third, the Court observed that “[t]he primary locus of this obligation is
Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”25 Fourth, the Court
stated that the reliability and admissibility of expert testimony depends upon
whether the theories and methodologies relied upon by the expert in forming
their opinion have been (1) scientifically “tested,”26 (2) the testing has been
subject of peer-reviewed critique and publication,27 (3) the testing has
21. As of November 23, 2018, Westlaw indicates that Daubert has been cited 143,324
times.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6 (“[W]e hold that Frye has been superseded and base the
discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
. . .”).
23. Id. at 589 n.7.
24. Id. at 596.
25. Id. at 589.
26. Id. at 593 (“Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes
science from other fields of human inquiry.” (citing ERIC GREEN & CHARLES NESSON,
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983))); see also CARL HEMPEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific
explanation must be capable of empirical test.”); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 48 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (emphasis
omitted)).
27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication. . . . The fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive,
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.
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produced an “known” “rate of error,”28 and (4) the “general acceptability” of
the theories and methodologies (a deferential reference to the earlier Frye
standard) is relevant, but neither necessary nor sufficient.29
Daubert assigned the trial court the role of “gatekeeper” for unreliable
expert testimony, which dramatically altered the judge’s role with respect to
the admissibility of expert testimony.30 Rather than answering a single
question, “is it novel scientific evidence,” the judge was given the
responsibility to review Daubert’s four-part test of “reliability” with respect
to the underlying theories31 and methodologies,32 if not the conclusions they
generated.33
Given Daubert’s sea change for admitting expert testimony, the next
question was the standard of review for a trial court’s expert testimony
decision. The Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,34 extended
broad discretion to trial courts by recognizing an “abuse of discretion”
Id.
28. Id. at 594.
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily
should consider the known or potential rate of error, see, e.g., United States v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 ([7th Cir.] 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate
of spectrographic voice identification technique), and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, see United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 ([2nd Cir.] 1978) (noting professional
organization's standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117, (1979).
Id. at 594.
29. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A ‘reliability
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant
scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within
that community.’” (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)));
see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ¶ 702.03, 702-41-42 (2d
ed. 2018).
30. Id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter
how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights
and innovations.” (emphasis added)).
31. Id. at 593 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication.”).
32. Id. (“Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them
to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry.” (citing GREEN & NESSON, supra note 26, at 645; see also HEMPEL,
supra note 26, at 49 (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable
of empirical test.”); POPPER, supra note 26, at 48 (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (emphasis deleted)).
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”).
34. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
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standard of review for all Daubert trial-judge determinations. The Court then
extended the Daubert analysis to experienced-based expert testimony in
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.35 The Court also held in Weisgram v.
Marley Co.36 that an appellate court may order an entry of judgment for the
verdict loser when a trial court has excluded evidence under Daubert,
reinforcing the responsibility of counsel at trial to ensure that a sufficient
Daubert foundation has been provided. Finally, the Court decided in Cavazos
v. Smith,37 a shaken-baby case, that once a trial court conducts a proper
Daubert analysis and admits expert testimony, the weight of that testimony
is for the jury.38
The Daubert paradigmatic change for expert testimony in the federal
courts dramatically impacted the issue of admissibility of expert testimony in
both federal and state courts, making the subject one of the most commonly
reviewed issues on appeal.39 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert, many states abandoned the Frye test and adopted the Daubert
analysis as controlling under state law.40 Many of the states that did not
expressly adopt the Daubert standard relied on the Daubert decision for
guidance in determining their own standards for the admissibility of expert

35.
36.
37.
38.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 443 (2000).
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 2 (2011)
Id. at 8.
In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Ninth Circuit plainly erred in
concluding that the jury's verdict was irrational, let alone that it was
unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise. . . . Doubts
about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable. But it is not the job of
this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State's
theory was correct. The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported
by the record.

Id.
39. As of November 23, 2018, Westlaw indicates that Daubert has been cited 143,324
times.
40. See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 758-59 (D.C. 2016) (“We adopt Rule
702 to apply to the trial of this case and to any civil or criminal case in which the trial begins
after the date of this opinion.”); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001);
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard);
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (“We accept the basic
reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated
reliability.”); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (Mont. 1994), abrogated by State v. Gollehon,
906 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1995), and Billings v. Bruce, 965 P.2d 866 (Mont. 1998) (“We conclude
that the guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our previous holding in Barmeyer
concerning the admission of expert testimony of novel scientific evidence, and we, therefore,
adopt the Daubert standard for the admission of scientific expert testimony.”).
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testimony.41 The few states that have retained the Frye single-factor standard
of general acceptability have generally modified that standard.42
41. See, e.g., People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 78-79 (Colo. 2001).
[W]e conclude that CRE 702, rather than Frye, represents the appropriate
standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. We hold that
under this standard, the focus of a trial court's inquiry should be on the reliability
and relevance of the scientific evidence, and that such an inquiry requires a
determination as to (1) the reliability of the scientific principles; (2) the
qualifications of the witness; and (3) the usefulness of the testimony to the jury.
We also hold that when a trial court applies CRE 702 to determine the reliability
of scientific evidence, its inquiry should be broad in nature and consider the
totality of the circumstances of each specific case.
Id.; Ingram v. State, 699 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Ind. 1998) (“In determining reliability, while various
factors have been identified, there is no specific ‘test’ or set of ‘prongs' which must be
considered in order to satisfy Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b).” (quoting McGrew v. State, 682
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997)));
Such factors may include, but are not limited to: 1) whether the technique has
been or can be empirically tested; 2) whether the technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error, as well as
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation; and 4) general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
Ingram, 699 N.E.2d at 262 n.5 (quoting McGrew, 682 N.E.2d at 1292)); State v. Hungerford,
697 A.2d 916, 922 (N.H. 1997).
Specifically, we considered important the presence of objective, quantifiable
evaluation results, the existence of a “logical nexus” between the expert's
observations and conclusions, the verifiability of any interpretive steps, and the
likely difficulty of effective cross-examination of the expert. . . . Also helpful are
the considerations enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert.
In applying Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Daubert Court discussed four
considerations bearing upon the reliability and helpfulness of scientific evidence:
(1) whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested; (2) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
potential or known error rate; and (4) whether there is general acceptance of the
theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 658-59 (Nev. 2010).
By not adopting the Daubert standard as a limitation on judges' considerations
with respect to the admission of expert testimony, we give Nevada trial judges
wide discretion, within the parameters of NRS 50.275, to fulfill their gatekeeping
duties. We determine that the framework provided by NRS 50.275 sets a degree
of regulation upon admitting expert witness testimony, without usurping the
trial judge's gatekeeping function.
....
. . . In sum, Daubert, as any other case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, is
looked upon favorably by this court. We do not, however, adopt the Daubert
standard as a limitation on the factors considered for admissibility of expert
witness testimony. We hold that NRS 50.275 provides the standard for
admissibility of expert witness testimony in Nevada.
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Almost simultaneously, and largely independently of the Daubert
revolution in the law of evidence, the medical teaching and practice
communities began adopting a paradigm shift known as “evidence-based
medicine.” The term “evidence-based medicine” was first coined in 1991, two
years before Daubert was decided.43 The “evidence-based medicine working
group” coined the phrase and identified the “paradigm shift” for the practice
and teaching of medicine as follows:
A new philosophy of medical practice and teaching has followed
these methodological advances. This paradigm shift is manifested
in a number of ways. A profusion of articles has been published
instructing clinicians on how to access, evaluate, and interpret the
medical literature. Proposals to apply the principles of clinical

Id.; McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997).
[W]e conclude that Tennessee’s adoption of Rules 702 and 703 in 1991 as part of
the Rules of Evidence supersede the general acceptance test of Frye. In
Tennessee, under the recent rules, a trial court must determine whether the
evidence will substantially assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue and
whether the facts and data underlying the evidence indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. The rules together necessarily require a determination as to the
scientific validity or reliability of the evidence. Simply put, unless the scientific
evidence is valid, it will not substantially assist the trier of fact, nor will its
underlying facts and data appear to be trustworthy, but there is no requirement
in the rule that it be generally accepted.
Although we do not expressly adopt Daubert, the non-exclusive list of factors to
determine reliability are useful in applying our Rules 702 and 703. A Tennessee
trial court may consider in determining reliability: (1) whether scientific
evidence has been tested and the methodology with which it has been tested; (2)
whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3)
whether a potential rate of error is known; (4) whether, as formerly required by
Frye, the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community; and (5)
whether the expert's research in the field has been conducted independent of
litigation.
Id.
42. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1252 (Cal. 2012) (Although
previously following the Frye standard, the court explained that the trial court, in considering
expert testimony, should “conduct[] a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to ‘determine whether, as a
matter of logic, the studies and other information cited by experts adequately support the
conclusion that the expert’s general theory or technique is valid.’ The goal of trial court
gatekeeping is simply to exclude ‘clearly invalid and unreliable’ expert opinion.” (internal
citations omitted)).
43. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the
Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992); see also Benjamin Djulbegovic &
Gordon Guyatt, Progress in Evidence-Based Medicine: A Quarter Century On, 390 LANCET 415
(2017).
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epidemiology to day-to-day clinical practice have been put
forward. A number of major medical journals have adopted a
more informative structured abstract format, which incorporates
issues of methods and design into the portion of an article the
reader sees first. The American College of Physicians has launched
a journal, ACP Journal Club, that summarizes new publications of
high relevance and methodological rigor. Textbooks that provide
a rigorous review of available evidence, including a methods
section describing both the methodological criteria used to
systematically evaluate the validity of the clinical evidence and the
quantitative techniques used for summarizing the evidence, have
begun to appear. Practice guidelines based on rigorous
methodological review of the available evidence are increasingly
common. A final manifestation is the growing demand for courses
and seminars that instruct physicians on how to make more
effective use of the medical literature in their day-to-day patient
care. We call the new paradigm "evidence-based medicine."44
The similarity and timing of the paradigm shift to evidence-based
medicine and the Court’s paradigm shift in Daubert to assessing the
reliability of the “principles and methodologies” is striking and compatible,
but the overlapping coherence of the two separate domains has seldom been
recognized by either profession.
This paper discusses how the paradigm shift of evidence-based-medicine
and the tools developed in that genre provide an important basis at every
stage of any expert’s “health related” testimony under the Daubert standard
of admissibility.45
II. DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 26(B)(2)
A. Qualification of the Expert
The first foundational step for admitting any expert testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 is the qualification of the expert by
education, training, or experience to give relevant expert testimony that “will
assist the trier of fact.”46 For a medical malpractice claim, expert testimony is

44. Guyatt, supra note 43, at 2421.
45. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015
WL 9596321.
46. Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2000).
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typically required as part of the prima facie case.47 If the jurisdiction by statute
or common law follows the “local practice” rule, an expert will have to have
experience and training with respect to the local practice to be qualified to
give testimony on the “local standard of care.”48 Additionally, “[p]ractitioners
in one specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the
standard of care applicable to another specialty.”49 For example, an
orthopedic surgeon would be qualified to testify about subjects within the
ambit of the field of orthopedic surgery, but would not be qualified to testify
about the standard of care for a nurse over which he had supervisory
responsibility, due to the “wide variation between schools in both precepts
and practices.”50 In assessing qualification, the expert’s familiarity with the
principles of evidence-based medicine is critical when addressing healthrelated opinions.
B. Principles or Theories of Reliability
Once an expert is qualified in a relevant area under investigation, the next
Daubert question is the reliability of the underlying principles or theories
upon which the expert relied. Many attorneys have a difficult time
formulating the principle or theory upon which health-related questions are
framed. Theories can be both general and specific with respect to both the
differential diagnosis and etiology.
The most general theory question for health-related questions, should be:
It is well-settled that trial judges have broad discretionary powers in determining
the qualification, and thus, admissibility, of expert witnesses. It is settled law in
this circuit that [w]hether a witness is qualified to express an expert opinion is a
matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In the absence of clear error,
as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision will not be reversed.
Id. (quoting Richmond Steel Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1992))
(internal quotations omitted).
47. Blevens v. Halcomb, 469 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Testimony that a physician
failed to live up to some vague ‘standard of care,’ without elaboration as to the content of that
standard, is insufficient to satisfy this burden.” (citing Ladish v. Gordon, 879 S.W.2d 623, 634
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994))).
48. Jerden v. Amstutz, 430 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The specific basis for
Defendant's objection to Dr. Gross's testimony should have been asserted when Dr. Gross
testified as to Defendant's compliance with his standard of care without reciting that he had
knowledge of the proper medical conduct within Defendant's community.”).
49. Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 232 P.3d 529, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (holding a
general pediatric physician was not qualified to give testimony on breach of the standard of
care of a critical care physician or to quantify the chance of survival absent the ventilator
failure).
50. De Adder v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 308 P.3d 543, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 2013).
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Q: What theory or principle did you rely upon in forming your
opinion?
A: I relied upon the theory or principle of evidence-based
medicine which helped inform both my general and specific
causation theories of the case.51
The follow-up Daubert questions and answers related to this
question should be:
Q: Has the theory of evidence-based medicine been tested?
A: Yes. Each of the studies relied upon by the expert have been
subjected to peer-reviewed analysis under the principles of
evidence-based medicine.52
Q: Has the testing been subject to peer-reviewed critique?
A: Yes. The theory of evidence-based medicine, as a paradigm for
expert practice, practice guidelines, and expert testimony, was first
coined in 1992, and has since been subject to countless articles and
papers in health-related areas.53
Q: Has the theory been subject to peer-reviewed critique?
A: Yes, since 1992 medical research has been replete with
discussion of, further elucidation, and refinement of the theory of
evidence-based medicine. Any Google search of the theory of
evidence-based medicine will demonstrate the depth of the
scientific literature validating evidence-based medicine as the
dominate theory of all health-related training and research.54
Q: Is there an established rate of error?
A: Yes. The underlying premise of evidence-based medicine is
that medical hypotheses should be tested and evaluated by
empirically-based studies formulated to understand the
appropriate confidence levels of the underlying medical
assumptions or practice guidelines. The established rate of error
in each instance is dependent upon the quantity and quality of the

51. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“The adjective
‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.”).
52. Id. at 593 (1993) (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether
a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it
can be (and has been) tested.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 593 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication.”).
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studies relied upon in forming the specifically applicable medicalrelated opinion.55
Q: Is the theory of “evidence-based medicine” generally accepted
in the relevant health-related community?
A: Yes, evidence-based medicine has become the norm of medical
education, practice training, and practice guidelines, as can be
demonstrated by reference to any medical curriculum.56
The more specific diagnosis and etiology theories would be more factspecific.
C. Methodologies
After asking about the principles or theories underling the expert’s
opinion, the next question on the Daubert checklist is whether the
methodologies relied upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion satisfy
the same Daubert reliability standards of “testability,” “peer reviewed
critique,” “established rate of error,” and “general acceptability”?
Several of the most “generally accepted” methodologies for evaluating
health-related conditions include SOAP, differential diagnosis, and
differential etiology.
Under the SOAP methodology, the physician (1) considers the subjective
complaints of the patient, (2) investigates the probabilities by objective tests,
(3) analyzes the information through a differential diagnosis, and (4) adopts
a plan of treatment.57
Under the well-established methodologies of differential diagnosis and
differential etiology, the health investigator considers all the alternatives
suggested by the subjective complaints and objective tests, analyzes the
information provided, rules out the least-likely diagnosis or cause, and
arrives at a plan or conclusion.58
In performing the ruling in and ruling out of the differential diagnosis or
etiology “methodologies,” the answer should be case-specific, depending

55. Id. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error . . .”).
56. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”).
57. LYNN S. BICKLEY, BATES’ GUIDE TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND HISTORY TAKING (12th
ed. 2017).
58. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Neb. 203, 237, 762 N.W.2d 24, 50 (2009)
(“If an expert's general causation opinion is admissible to show that a suspected agent should
be ruled in as a possible cause of the plaintiff's disease, the court must next determine whether
the expert performed a reliable differential etiology.”).
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upon the form of the case study relied upon and its ranking on the evidencebased medicine pyramid.
The evidence-based methodology for ruling in and ruling out the
possibilities to perform the differential diagnosis or etiology has four steps:
(1) finding the appropriate research study, (2) searching the literature, (3)
ranking the evidence-based levels of reliability, and (4) critiquing the study
using the principles of evidence-based medicine.59
1. The First Methodological Step: Finding the Appropriate Research
Study that Formulated a Relevant Question
Medical researchers first formulate the clinical problem being
investigated.60 Expert witnesses seeking evidence-based support for their
opinions, investigate the “fit” of the extant studies on the same issue. If no
study fits precisely under the question being investigated, then the closest
study should be examined with full recognition that an “unfair factual
extrapolation”61 argument may be fairly made. The Federal Advisory
Committee Notes on Rule 702 suggest that whether the relevant study is
“litigation-dependent” should be considered when deciding admissibility. 62
As a methodology for formulating the research question, both the
researcher and the expert must first define precisely whom the question is
about by asking, “How would I describe a group of patients similar to this
one?” Demographic features such as age, gender, and race describe the
patient group. Medical risk factors and conditions also define the patient
group. Second, the researcher or expert should describe the
intervention/maneuver that will be performed or has been performed on the
patient population. Third, if necessary, the researcher or expert should
provide or investigate a comparison maneuver. For example, the intervention
can be the administration of a drug or diagnostic radiologic exam and the
comparison can be a placebo or an alternative diagnostic exam. Fourth, the
researcher or expert should define the outcome such as reduced mortality or
improved quality of life.

59. TRISHA GREENHALGH, HOW TO READ A PAPER: THE BASICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
MEDICINE 39 (5th ed. 2014).
60. Id.
61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one
purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”).
62. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (In 2000, the Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 702 identified as a bias factor related to the issue of admissibility and impeachment,
the “(1) whether” the testimony relates to “matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the litigation,” or developed “expressly for
purposes of testifying.”).
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These four steps formulating the question under investigation are
commonly known by the “PICO” pneumonic: patient group, intervention,
comparison and outcome.63 Foundation for the PICO methodology can be
established through the same Daubert checklist:
Q: Has the PICO methodology for formulating a medical research
question been tested?
A: Yes. Each of the studies relied upon by the expert were the
product of a PICO analysis consistent with the premises of
evidence-based medicine.
Q: Has the specific PICO study been subject to peer-reviewed
critique?
A: Yes. This study was published in a reputable scientific journal.
Q: Is the journal a peer-reviewed journal?
A: Yes.
Q: Did the study discuss any probability analysis for the results?
A: Yes. The study had a probability analysis published as part of
the research.
Q: Are the conclusions of the study generally-accepted in the
relevant scientific community?
A: Yes.
The “reliability” or “general acceptability” of the study depends, in part,
upon whether these steps have been adequately taken. Other considerations
include the quantity and quality of the study. Finally, the question in
litigation is whether the study is sufficiently analogous to the question being
litigated that the expert can fairly extrapolate from the study and the theory
of general causation to the facts of the case or the issue of specific causation.
2. Second Step: Searching the Literature
After precisely formulating the clinical problem much like the original
researcher, the expert, consistent with evidence-based medicine, should
perform the appropriate literature search.64 Federal Rule of Evidence Rule
703 enables an expert to rely on inadmissible evidence, such as research
studies, if the evidence is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.65 Also,
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(18) permits an expert to read to the trier
of fact the content of “learned treatises” if they are reasonably relied upon by
63. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802,
1804 (2015); Marie Staunton, Evidence-Based Radiology: Steps 1 and 2—Asking Answerable
Questions and Searching for Evidence, 242 RADIOLOGY 23, 24 (2007).
64. Id. at 25.
65. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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experts in the field.66 These evidentiary rules separately affirm the
admissibility of “reliable” excerpts from “learned treatises” and specify the
method the information will be communicated to the trier of fact, both as a
basis for expert testimony and as independent evidence orally presented to
the jury.
Google Scholar and PubMed search the web for useful primary scientific
literature containing both the studies and the peer reviewed critique
referenced by the Supreme Court in Daubert. For quick clinical searches,
Google Scholar returns more relevant articles and provides greater access to
free full-text articles.67 PubMed is more valuable than Google Scholar when
performing a more thorough primary literature review.68 The secondary
literature summarizes the primary literature often through systematic
reviews, a highly ranked form of evidence under the evidence-based medicine
paradigm.
The Cochrane and DARE databases search systematic reviews. These
reviews have a higher level of evidence and, thus, have more appeal in the
courtroom. A thorough literature review can be a time-consuming process
and can be outside of the expertise of many physicians. For this reason, it may
be worthwhile to employ a health librarian to provide a professionalliterature search. The question of whether an expert did an adequate
literature review is an important question for either direct or crossexamination.
Search Engine
Google Scholar
PubMed
Cochrane
Database
DARE
Database
TRIP Database

URL
https://scholar.google.com
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/

Contents
Primary Literature
Primary Literature

http://www.thecochranelibrary.com

Systematic Reviews

http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/crdweb/

Systematic Reviews

https://tripdatabase.com

Primary and
Secondary Literature

66. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
67. Salimah Shariff et al., Retrieving Clinical Evidence: A Comparison of PubMed and
Google Scholar for Quick Clinical Searches, 15 J. MED. INTERNET RES. E164 (2013); Austin v. Am.
Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is an abundance
of up-to-date relevant literature easily retrievable from the World Wide Web.”).
68. Michael Anders & Dennis Evans, Comparison of PubMed and Google Scholar
Literature Searches, 55 RESPIRATORY CARE 578, 582(2010); Wichor M. Bramer et al., The
Comparative Recall of Google Scholar Versus PubMed in Identical Searches for Biomedical
Systematic Reviews, 2 SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 115 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1186/2046-4053-2115.
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Once an article of interest is discovered, both a researcher and an expert
in review should read the articles that have cited the lead article. These cited
articles may agree or disagree with the findings. Support or criticism would
be relevant to direct or cross-examination. Citation chaining can be
performed easily with Google Scholar. Once an article is found, click on the
“cited by” feature to find the citation chain.
3. Third Step: Ranking the “Evidence-based” Levels of Reliability
The third step in evidence-based medicine is to lexically order the
epistemological strength of health-related decision-making and practice
guidelines to the strength of the supporting empirically-based research. The
lexical ordering of the studies, often depicted by a “pyramid of reliability,”
ranks in descending order of reliability empirically-based meta-analyses,
systematic reviews, randomized controlled trials, case-control studies,
anecdotal experiences or individualized case-studies, animal studies, and,
finally, in vitro studies. The lexical ordering has been memorialized by
various versions of the below depicted evidence-based medicine pyramid:
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The Oxford Center for Evidence-Based Medicine created a heuristic
device, the “Levels of Evidence,” that gives a quick assessment of a research
study’s level of trustworthiness, irrespective of the journal of origin.69 Expert
witnesses should always consider the “Levels of Evidence” associated with
any research relied upon. Research studies with a study design ranked at the
top of the ranking system are held to be more reliable than those at the
bottom of the ranking system. Originally, one universal rating system was
created to rank all types of studies. However, experience taught that such a
simplified rating system overgeneralizes. For example, the study type that
best determines the effectiveness of a new drug would not be equally effective
in assessing the quality of a diagnostic test. To adjust to this complexity, the
current ranking system of Level of Evidence varies depending on the research
question being asked (see attached tables).
Table 1 of 2.70
Step2
Step3
(Level2*)
(Level3*)
Systematic review
Local and current
How
of surveys that
random sample
Local non-random
common is
allow matching to
surveys (or
sample**
the problem?
local
censuses)
circumstances**
Systematic review
Individual cross
Non-consecutive
Is this
of cross sectional
sectional studies
studies, or studies
diagnostic or studies with
with consistently
without consistently
monitoring consistently
applied reference
applied reference
test accurate? applied reference
standard and
standards**
(Diagnosis) standard and
blinding
blinding
What will
happen if we Systematic review
Cohort study or
Inception cohort
do not add a of inception
control arm of
studies
therapy?
cohort studies
randomized trial*
(Prognosis)
Question

Step1
(Level1*)

69. Jonathan D. Dodd, Evidence-Based Practice in Radiology: Steps 3 and 4—Appraise and
Apply Diagnostic Radiology Literature, 242 RADIOLOGY 342, 345-46 (2007); OCEBM Levels of
Evidence,
OXFORD
CTR.
FOR
EVIDENCE-BASED
MED.
(May
1,
2016),
https://www.cebm.net/2016/05/ocebm-levels-of-evidence/.
70. The table can be viewed in its PDF format at http://www.cebm.net/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-2.1.pdf.
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Question

Step1
(Level1*)

Step2
(Level2*)

Does this
intervention
help?
(Treatment
Benefits)

Systematic review
of randomized
trials or n-of-1
trials

Randomized trial
or observational
study with
dramatic effect

Systematic review
of randomized
trials, systematic
review of nested
What are the case-control
COMMON studies, n- of 1
harms?
trial with the
(Treatment patient you are
Harms)
raising the
question about, or
observational
study with
dramatic effect
What are the
RARE
Systematic review
harms?
of randomized
(Treatment trials or n-of-1trial
Harms)
Is this (early
Systematic review
detection)
of randomized
test
worthwhile? trials
(Screening)

355
Step3
(Level3*)
Non-randomized
controlled
cohort/follow-up
study**

Non-randomized
controlled
Individual
randomized trial cohort/follow-up
or (exceptionally) study (postmarketing
observational
surveillance)
study with
provided there are
dramatic effect
sufficient numbers
to rule out a
common harm. (For
long-term harms the
Randomized trial duration of followor (exceptionally up must be
sufficient.)**
observational
study with
dramatic effect
Non-randomized
controlled
Randomized trial
cohort/follow-up
study**
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Table 2 of 2.71
Question
How common is the
problem?
Is this diagnostic or
monitoring test accurate?
(Diagnosis)
What will happen if we do
not add a therapy?
(Prognosis)

Step 4 (Level 4*)
Case-series**

Case-control studies, or “poor or
non-independent reference
standard**
Case-series or case-control
studies, or poor quality
prognostic cohort study**
Case-series, case-control studies,
Does this intervention
or historically controlled
help? (Treatment Benefits)
studies**
What are the COMMON
harms? (Treatment
Harms)
Case-series, case-control, or
historically controlled studies**
What are the RARE
harms? (Treatment
Harms)
Is this (early detection)
Case-series, case-control, or
test worthwhile?
historically controlled studies**
(Screening)

Step 5
(Level 5)
n/a
Mechanismbased
reasoning
n/a
Mechanismbased
reasoning
Mechanismbased
reasoning
Mechanismbased
reasoning

*Level may be graded down on the basis of study quality, imprecision,
indirectness (study PICO does not match questions PICO), because of
inconsistency between studies, or because the absolute effect size is very
small; Level may be graded up if there is a large or very large effect size.
**As always, a systematic review is generally better than an individual
study.72
The physician or expert uses the clinical question to find the appropriate
row in Oxford’s table. The physician or expert then searches for articles that
receive the level 1 score. If the question is about the efficacy of a therapy, then
a systematic review of a randomized controlled trial is preferred. If one wants
to demonstrate the validity of a diagnostic test, then use a systematic review
71. The table can be viewed in its PDF format at http://www.cebm.net/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-2.1.pdf.
72. OCEBM Levels of Evidence, supra note 69.
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of a cross-sectional survey. For causation, use a systematic review of cohort
studies. If no level 1 evidence is found, then the physician or expert proceeds
down the row to level 2, then level 3, and so on. The Oxford’s Evidence Based
Medicine Table lexically orders the reliability of studies from least reliable to
most reliable.
a. Lowest Levels of Evidence: Anecdotal Expert Opinions or Case
Reports
Science values the opinion of an expert, whether it is based on mechanistic
reasoning or based on clinical experience, for this opinion often serves as the
basis to start an empiric investigation. However, an expert’s “experiential”
opinion without evidence-based research studies to validate or refute, is
ordered the least reliable of all expert opinions, especially where confirming
or refuting studies are available, as in the Austin case below. A brief written
by the Wisconsin Medical Society to the court argues:
[T]he Society asks this Court to recognize that medical opinions
that are supported solely by unsystematic clinical observations
presumptively fail to cross the Daubert reliability threshold. These
include both a physician’s subjective beliefs based solely on their
personal credentials and experience as well as medical literature
identified as case reports. While such evidence may be properly
part of physicians’ decision-making process, it lacks an objective
methodology on which physicians, and in turn courts, can rely.
This is not to say that physician experience and clinical
observations have no place in expert testimony. Training and
experience plays a large role in medical analysis and decision
making, and that training and experience can be incorporated into
expert testimony. However, from a medical perspective,
conclusions based solely on experience and anecdote are regarded
with suspect in their application to other patients and
circumstances.73
In Austin v. American Association of Neurological Surgeons,74 the claimant,
Dr. Austin, sued his medical society for suspending him for “irresponsible
expert testimony.”75 In denying Dr. Austin’s claim, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained,
73. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015
WL 9596321, at *9.
74. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001).
75. Id. at 971.
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[T]here is little doubt that his [anecdotally-based] testimony was
irresponsible and that it violated a number of sensible-seeming
provisions . . . . [Including the provision that a medical society
member] should provide the court with accurate and
documentable opinions on the matters at hand.76
What makes this case interesting is that the court performed its own
evidence-based medicine literature search on the topic that would have
placed the anecdotal testimony in an improved context. The court chastised
the expert witnesses for not doing the literature search that would have
enhanced the reliability of the expert testimony:
Oddly, apart from Cloward’s article, and the Watkins article of
unknown provenance (unknown to the lawyers, that is), no
literature on anterior cervical fusion or injuries to the recurrent
laryngeal nerve was presented either to the Association’s hearing
board or to the district court, although some additional literature
had been presented at the malpractice trial and there is an
abundance of up-to-date relevant literature easily retrievable from
the World Wide Web. There we discover in a cursory search that
permanent damage to the recurrent laryngeal nerve is a known
though fortunately rare complication of anterior cervical fusion (a
1982 study found only 52 cases of paralysis to the recurrent
laryngeal nerve in 70,000 such operations—.07 percent) against
which the patients should be warned.77
In Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. and Medical Center,78 a patient claimed that
Defendant’s negligence resulted in a delay in diagnosis of a post-operative
septic knee joint resulting in exacerbation of knee joint destruction. The
plaintiff’s expert witness, Depuy, based his testimony exclusively on his own
extensive clinical experience of having performed over two-thousand
arthroscopic surgeries. In excluding this experienced-based anecdotal
testimony as too low on the evidence-based medicine pyramid, the court
explained:
Depuy’s conclusion, which appears to be based on no scientific
support other than his own personal experience of not having
encountered instances of fluid draining from knees of patients on
whom he has operated, bears none of the hallmarks of reliability
necessary for it to be considered admissible under Daubert and
76. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
77. Austin, 253 F.3d at 970-71.
78. Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

2019]

EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE

359

Rule 702 . . . . [O]f the basic four criteria on which a Daubert
reliability analysis typically rests, two are particularly relevant in
cases in which the expert testimony is based on personal
experience: the rate of error of the experience-based methodology
and “whether such a method is generally accepted in the scientific
community.” An anecdotal account of one expert’s experience,
however extensive or impressive the numbers it encompasses,
does not by itself equate to a methodology, let alone one generally
accepted by the relevant professional community.79
b. Second Lowest Level of Reliability: Case Reports and Case Series
The Oxford’s Evidence Based Medicine Table ranks a case report or a case
series as the second lowest level of reliability for evidence-based medicine. A
case report gives a detailed description of the symptoms, signs, diagnosis,
treatment and follow-up of an individual patient. The value of a case report
is in describing a rare or previously unreported event. This report might
sensitize readers and facilitate detection of similar cases leading to the
reporting of a case series, a study that organizes multiple case reports around
a central theme.80 A case series can be used to generate hypotheses for more
rigorous research studies, but alone is nothing more than the reporting of an
unreliable anecdotal experience.
Case reports and case series have many limitations that result in their low
ranking on the tier of Levels of Evidence. First, these reports and series are
not chosen from representative populations and consequently cannot
generate information on incidence or prevalence of disease. Second, case
studies have no control groups; a large case series can imply a causal
relationship, but without a control, these case series cannot be relied upon to
determine a causal relationship.81
This low estimation of case studies holds for both evidence-based
medicine and judicial analysis of case studies. For example, in Siharath v.
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation,82 a post-partum woman suffered a
hemorrhagic stroke after taking a prescription drug manufactured by the
defendant.83 The plaintiff tried to prove causality through case reports. In
granting a summary judgment, the court explained that Plaintiff’s
79. Id. at 354 (internal citation omitted).
80. Trygve Nissen & Rolf Wynn, The Clinical Case Report: A Review of its Merits and
Limitations, 7 BMC RES. NOTES 264 (2014).
81. Id.
82. Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
83. Id. at 1349, aff’d sub nom.; Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir.
2002).
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experts (1) have failed to provide any evidence, either published
or unpublished, that Parlodel® increases one’s risk of stroke; (2)
rely on uncontrolled and unreliable spontaneous reports and
anecdotal case reports as the basis for their opinions; and (3)
cannot show that their opinions have an acceptable error rate or
are otherwise generally accepted.84
The court further explained that Plaintiff did not satisfy their
burden of proof:
No evidence has been offered of an increase in postpartum strokes
after the drug was approved for suppression of lactation; no
evidence has been offered of a decrease in postpartum strokes after
the approval for suppression of lactation was withdrawn. The
absence of epidemiological support raises the question of whether
the causation opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts are merely speculative
and not based on scientific knowledge. 85
The court further dissected the case reports the Plaintiff relied
upon as an unfair extrapolation:
The [alleged] adverse drug reports . . . lack the requisite quantity,
nature and content. From 1980 to 1994, millions of women took
Parlodel®. The modest number of case reports associating the drug
with stroke or even postpartum hypertension is not what would
be expected if there was a significant increased risk. Only one
report exists that links Parlodel® to a stroke, and in that case the
patient suffered from an underlying condition that itself can cause
stroke. No other patient in any case reports suffered any form of
stroke. The other patients instead suffered non-cerebral effects
such as hypertension and myocardial infarction. Many of the case
reports cited involved patients who were not postpartum. One
case report involved a patient who was dechallenged but
continued to suffer from hypertension for another four to five
days. In short, Plaintiffs’ [expert has] not pointed to a single case
report involving a postpartum woman who suffered a
hemorrhagic stroke. Accordingly, even if case reports could be
used to establish general causation, any reasonable observer would
have to conclude that they are insufficient to do so in this case.
The case reports simply lack the quantity, nature and content that
84. Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
85. Id. at 1358 (internal citations omitted).
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Dr. Dukes himself claims is necessary for case reports to provide
reliable scientific information about causation.86
Finally, the court made the point that even Plaintiff’s expert on crossexamination conceded that case reports can never establish general
causation:
Both of Plaintiffs’ experts who testified at the Daubert hearing
recognize the severe limitations of case reports and differential
diagnosis in establishing general causation. Dr. Kulig admitted the
limitations in the following exchange:
Q: As a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig, case reports
do not establish general causation and you would never attempt
to do so, true?
A: True.
Q: And as a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig, case series
do not establish general causation and you would never attempt
to do so, true?
A: True.
Q: And as a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig,
differential diagnosis as applied to a specific patient cannot
establish general causation?
A: In and of itself, I wouldn’t establish it, but now you’re getting
closer.
Case reports can establish only specific causation. Testimony
regarding specific causation, however, is irrelevant unless general
causation is established. Accordingly, given the limits of case
reports in establishing general causation, as recognized by
Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs’ reliance
upon case reports as a substitute for epidemiology cannot
withstand the scrutiny that Daubert requires.87

86. Id. at 1361.
87. Id. at 1363 (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, case studies are generally inadequate sources for establishing
general causation under evidence-based medicine.
c. Third Level or Mid-Tier Levels of Evidence: Observational
Studies (Case-Control Studies)
A case-control study compares a group of patients with a disease with
another group of patients without a disease to determine whether a potential
causal attribute is more associated with the disease group than the control
group. A clarifying example occurred in history when Drs. Doll and Hill
studied whether smoking causes lung cancer. For every newly admitted
patient with lung cancer, they selected another patient of the same age and
gender but with a sickness other than lung cancer. They then asked each
group whether or not they smoked. The results revealed a statistically
significant relationship between smoking and lung cancer.88
As implied by their relatively low status of “mid-tiered” on Oxford’s Level
of Evidence, case-control studies have limitations. One of the biggest
limitations of case-control studies is that they can show a correlation but they
cannot prove causation.89 For this reason, Dr. Doll quickly followed his casecontrol study with a more reliable case-cohort study, the natural progression
of evidence-based research.90 Cohort studies compare groups who have been
“exposed” to an agent at issue, with groups who have not been exposed.91 The
study compares each group’s rate of disease with or without exposure.92 Casecontrol studies, in comparison, compare a group with a disease with a group
without the disease and investigate past exposures to determine whether an
association exists between the exposure and the incidence of the disease.93
However, an association, by itself, cannot establish causation.94 These
observational studies only show the “degree of statistical relationship
between two or more events or variables. Events are said to be associated
when they occur more or less frequently together than one would expect by
chance.”95 An “association” can be quantified by statistical analysis into
88. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J.
739, 740, 746 (1950).
89. TRISHA GREENHALGH, HOW TO READ A PAPER: THE BASICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
MEDICINE 39 (5th ed. 2014).
90. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in Relation
to Smoking; A Second Report on the Mortality of British Doctors, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1071 (1956).
91. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 340 (2d ed. 2000).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 342.
94. Id. at 374.
95. Id. at 387.
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“relative risk.,”96 “Relative risk” is “defined as the ratio of the incidence rate
(often referred to as incidence) of disease in exposed individual to the
incidence rate in unexposed individuals.”97 If the “relative risk” is 1, “the risk
in exposed individuals is the same as the risk in unexposed individuals.”98
Thus if the relative risk is 1, then “[t]here is no association between exposure
to the agent and disease.”99 If the relative risk is greater than 1, “[t]here is a
positive association between exposure to the agent and the disease, which
could be causal.”100 From a probability perspective, ““[t]he higher the relative
risk, the greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal.”101
Under the court’s “gatekeeping” responsibility under Daubert,102 an expert
must express an opinion to a reasonable degree of probability, a burden that
may keep the jury from hearing useful information about association. If the
“probability” burden were translated directly to the issue of “relative risk,”
then the relative risk would have to be greater than 2.0 for any expert to
express an opinion to a reasonable degree of probability. This is because if
the relative risk is 2.0, “the agent is responsible for an equal number of cases
of disease as all other background causes.”103 This finding from a probability
perspective “implies a 50% likelihood than an exposed individual’s disease
was caused by the agent.”104 Because the Rule 104(a) burden for the
admissibility of evidence under the Daubert gatekeeping responsibility is
“reasonable degree of probability,” an expert must express two forms of
“causation” opinions at “probability” level.105 The first causation opinion is
that the agent has the capacity of causing the disease or problem at a
probability level. This “general causation” theory, can be contrasted to the

96. Id. at 348.
97. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 348.
98. Id. at 349.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 376.
102. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“We recognize that, in
practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.” (emphasis added)).
103. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 384.
104. Id. at 384.
105. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Neb. 203, 212–13 (2009). (“To prevail, a
plaintiff must show both general and specific causation. But a court should first consider
whether a party has presented admissible general causation evidence before considering the
issue of admissible specific causation evidence.”).
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second causation opinion, that the agent was the “actual cause,” where other
possible causes of this particular disease can be reasonably ruled out.106
Courts considering the “general,”107 “generic,”108 or “capable of causing”109
theory of causal connection between the subject agent generally have not
adopted a consensus “statistical” standard of probability for this relationship.
Some courts have reversed jury verdicts where the supporting statistical
studies establishing general causation were lacking.110 Some commentators
have recommended111 and some courts have required proof of a relative risk
of 2.0 or greater to prove general causation.112 Other courts have not required

106. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (contrasting “generic causation—that the defendant was
responsible for a tort which had the capacity to cause the harm alleged—with individual
proximate cause and individual damage”).
107. Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]estimony
on specific causation ha[s] legitimacy only as follow-up to [general causation]”); In re Bextra
& Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (“General or generic causation means ‘whether the substance at issue had the capacity
to cause the harm alleged.’”) (citing In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124,
1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (“General, or ‘generic’ causation has been defined by courts to mean
whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged . . . .”)).
108. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (“This enabled
the court to determine a kind of generic causation—whether the combination of the chemical
contaminants and the plaintiffs’ exposure to them had the capacity to cause the harm
alleged.”).
109. Id. at 1199–200 (“[T]he district court concluded that Velsicol’s chemicals and the
duration of the plaintiffs’ exposure to them were capable of causing the types of injuries alleged
. . .”); Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To prove causation in a
toxic tort case, a plaintiff must show both that the alleged toxin is capable of causing injuries
like that suffered by the plaintiff in human beings subjected to the same level of exposure as
the plaintiff, and that the toxin was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”).
110. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1989),
amended, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1999) (“The plaintiffs did
not offer one statistically significant (one whose confidence interval did not include 1.0) study
that concludes that Bendectin is a human teratogen. No published epidemiological study has
found a statistically significant increased risk between exposure to Bendectin and birth
defects.”).
111. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than Two in Proof
of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2001).
112. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998) (“None of these
studies reports a statistically significant elevation of risk of rheumatic or connective tissue
disease, either classic or atypical, over 2.0.”); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950
F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Since Thrasher’s probability estimate is not founded
upon epidemiological studies showing a relative risk of greater than two, or some other
evidence that would lend a scientific foundation to the assertion that fragrances more likely
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“a mathematically precise table” equating levels of exposure with levels of
harm to establish general causation.”113
King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Railway Company114 provides an example
of the discussion of relative risk, the issue of general causation and probability
analysis. In King the question was whether the deceased’s work-related
exposure to benzene found in diesel fuel caused the multiple myeloma cancer
from which he died. One of the issues presented was whether the plaintiff had
to establish a relative risk of greater than two to survive a Daubert challenge
on the issue of general causation. Addressing this issue, the court presented
a scholarly discussion of the relationship between relative risk and proof of
general causation. In declining to set a minimum threshold for relative risk,
the court made several points. First, the court observed: “[w]hile important,
a positive association presents only one piece of the causation puzzle.”115
Second, “[o]nce an association has been found between exposure to an agent
and development of a disease, researchers consider whether the association
reflects a true cause-effect relationship.”116 Third, while “[e]pidemiologists
use causation to mean that an increase in the incidence of disease among the
exposed subjects would not have occurred had they not been exposed to the
agent . . .117 determining causation differs from the objective inquiry into
relative risk.” Fourth, “[a]n assessment of a causal relationship is not a
scientific methodology as that term is used to describe logic (like a syllogism)
and analytic methods. Instead, it involves subjective judgment.”118 Finally,
the court noted that “[e]xperts consider several factors under different sets of
criteria that can point to causation. Relative risk presents only one factor that
they consider.”119 Based upon these principles, the court in King observed,
“we believe that requiring a study to show a relative risk of 2.0 or greater is

than not caused plaintiff’s injuries, it does not constitute a valid scientific connection to the
pertinent inquiry of causation.” (internal citations omitted)).
113. Bednar v. Bassett Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 F.3d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The Bednars
did not need to produce ‘a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels
of harm’ in order to show Marian’s level of exposure to gaseous formaldehyde, but only
‘evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that [the] defendant’s emission has
probably caused’ the harm about which they complain.”).
114. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009).
115. Id. at 39.
116. Id. (citing the REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 374.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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too restrictive when the expert relies on the study to support an opinion on
general causation.”120 Instead, the court concluded:
So we decline to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, or any
other statistical measurement, above the minimum requirement
that the study show a relative risk greater than 1.0. We agree that
“it would be far preferable for the district court to instruct the jury
on statistical significance and then let the jury decide whether
many studies over the 1.0 mark have any significance in
combination.” In short, the significance of epidemiological studies
with weak positive associations is a question of weight, not
admissibility.121
On the separate issue of “specific” or “actual” cause, the court explained,
“[i]f an expert’s general causation opinion is admissible to show that a
suspected agent should be ruled in as a possible cause of the plaintiff’s disease,
the court must next determine whether the expert performed a reliable
differential etiology.”122 The court explained that first, “[t]o perform an
adequate differential etiology, a medical expert must first compile a
comprehensive list of hypotheses that might explain the set of salient clinical
findings under consideration.”123 Second, “the expert engages in a process of
elimination, based on the evidence, to reach a conclusion regarding the most
likely cause of the disease.”124
Apart from the issue of the “relative risk” findings of a study for
determining general causation, misclassification of “cases” can be a
potentially non-obvious cause for bias in case-control studies.125 To avoid this
problem, studies need to clearly define what is a “case” and when that
individual becomes a “case.” The importance of this potential bias emerged
in the debate about the pertussis vaccine. Between 1976 and 1979 a large casecontrol study was performed in Britain called the National Childhood
Encephalopathy Study (“NCES”).126 The case group in this study consisted of
120. Burlington N., 762 N.W.2d at 46.
121. Id. at 46-47 (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir.
1995)).
122. Id. at 50.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Karen T. Copeland et al., Bias Due to Misclassification in the Estimation of Relative
J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
488
(1977),
Risk,
105
AM.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112408.
126. David L. Miller & Euan McDonald Ross, National Childhood Encephalopathy Study:
An Interim Report, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 992 (1978).
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all children under three years of age admitted to British hospitals with the
diagnosis of an acute serious neurological illness. The study matched the sex,
age, and area of residence of the case group to two separate control groups.
The study found seven post-DTP vaccination patients with severe neurologic
deficits. Extrapolation of this number revealed a rate of permanent
neurologic of 1:330,000.127
A British court thoroughly examined the NCES study in 1988.128 The judge
ruled that the NCES study misclassified three of the seven post-DTP
vaccination patients as having severe neurologic deficits. The judge
concluded that two of the patients had a viral illness and one was a case of
Reye’s syndrome. After this reevaluation of the results of the study, there was
no significant increase of encephalopathy in the vaccinated patients.
The NCES study and the follow-up case illustrate two points. First, a casecontrol study needs to be careful about the definition of what is termed a
“case”. The NCES provided data on 5.4 million child-years of observation,
but the judge’s reclassification of three patients changed the result from
statistically significant to not.129 Second, in the setting of a trial where medical
literature is cited, it makes sense to intensely scrutinize and challenge the
literature rather than simply taking a study at face value.
d. Fourth Level of Reliability under the Oxford Standards: The
Cohort Study
Cohort studies rank higher under the Oxford standards than casecontrolled studies. Cohort studies differ from case-control studies by being
prospective or forward looking. In a cohort study, two or more groups of
people are selected based upon the differences in their exposure to a
particular agent. These groups are followed over time (prospectively) to
determine whether they develop a particular disease or another outcome.
An example cohort study is a follow-up lung cancer study performed by
Drs. Doll and Hill. Doctors Doll and Hill followed their case-control smoking
study with what they deemed to be a more reliable cohort study. They sent
questionnaires to 40,000 men and women in the British Medical Register.
They separated the smokers and non-smokers into different groups and then
127. David L. Miller et al., Pertussis Immunisation and Serious Acute Neurological Illness
in Children, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 1595 (1981); Simon Shorvon & Anne Berg, Pertussis Vaccination
and Epilepsy—An Erratic History, New Research and the Mismatch Between Science and Social
Policy, 49 EPILEPSIA 219 (2008).
128. Loveday v. Renton (1990) 1 Med. L.R. 117 (Q.B.).
129. Simon Shorvon & Anne Berg, Pertussis Vaccination and Epilepsy—An Erratic History,
New Research and the Mismatch Between Science and Social Policy, 49 EPILEPSIA 219, 220
(2008).
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followed up with them in different intervals to determine whether any died,
and if they did die, from what cause. They found smoking to be statistically
significantly associated with lung cancer-induced mortality.130
In general, evidence-based medicine favors cohort studies over casecontrol studies, however, neither of these observational epidemiological
studies can prove causation. They can only show correlation. To prove
causation, researchers and the courts often rely on criteria termed the
“Bradford Hill” factors for causation.131
The Bradford Hill factors provide another example of a generally accepted
methodology for determining the causal relationship between a source and
disease or outcome. Such factors may be admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence Rule 803(17) as protocol generally followed by people within a
particular occupation.132 Once admitted, the expert can walk down the steps
and explain how the methodology provided a basis for a differential etiology,
another well-established methodology that can be validated by expert
testimony as generally relied upon by medical experts in the field. Courts
have judicially noticed the methodologies of differential diagnosis and
etiology as reliable methodologies for determining issues of diagnosis and
causation.133
The nine Bradford Hill factors are (1) temporal relationship, (2) strength
of the association, (3) dose-response relationship, (4) replication of the
findings, (5) biological plausibility, (6) consideration of alternative
explanations, (7) cessation of exposure, (8) specificity of the association, and
(9) consistency with other knowledge.134 To apply this to the case of smoking
and lung cancer, if the study shows a dose-response relationship of smoking
and lung cancer, then that would serve as supporting evidence for causality.
130. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, The Mortality of Doctors in Relation to Their Smoking
Habits, 1 BRIT. MED. J.1451, 1454, 1455 (1954).
131. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009) (citing FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 340 (2d ed. 2000) and MICHAEL
D. GREEN ET AL., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ET AL., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 335, 335-36 (3d ed. 2000)); Michael Höfler, The Bradford
Hill Considerations on Causality: A Counterfactual Perspective, 2 EMERGING THEMES
EPIDEMIOLOGY 11 (2005); A. Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?, 58 PROCS. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295 (1965).
132. FED. R. EVID. 803(17) (“Market quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations
that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations.”).
133. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994); Coastal Tankships,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App. 2002); Carlson v. Okerstrom, 675 N.W.2d
89 (Neb. 2004); Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001).
134. Burlington N., 762 N.W.2d at 40 (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN ET AL., Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 131, at 375-76.).
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The more Bradford Hill factors that apply to the situation, the greater the
probability of causality.135
The issue of bias in a cohort study is always important to review. The two
groups selected in the cohort study need to be as close as possible to being
identical, with the sole exception being their exposure to the agent being
studied. The greater the differences between the groups, the greater the risk
of bias. 136
e. Fifth Level: Cross-Sectional Studies
Diagnostic studies often utilize the cross-sectional method. The diagnostic
test being studied (the “index test”) and a reference test are administered to
a given patient population. The results of the tests are compared to determine
the accuracy of the index test. The studied patient population can be selected
via either the case-control method or a consecutive series method. In the
case-control selection, the researcher selects case patients with a known
disease and compares them to control patients who are known not to have
the disease. This artificial selection of a patient pool is performed because the
methodology is cheap and fast. For this reason, it is often used in the initial
evaluation of a diagnostic test or in the evaluation of a rare disease. However,
just because a test has good accuracy in the artificial environment of a casecontrol study does not necessarily mean that the test will be accurate in the
clinical setting. To best test for the accuracy of a diagnostic test in the clinical
setting, a consecutive series method is used. In this method, patients
suspected of having the disease, but in whom disease status is unknown, are
given both the index test and the reference test. Ideally, these patients are
consecutively chosen from the appropriate clinical setting.137
The patient group composition can dramatically affect the study results. A
study which only includes very sick patients and perfectly healthy patients
will make a test look better than it is. This is called spectrum bias.138 The
prevalence of disease, severity of disease, and presence of comorbid
conditions can all have a big effect. For example, a mammogram on a
screening population will have different sensitivity and specificity for disease
than a mammogram on a patient population with a palpable lump. The
physician or expert using the study needs to ascertain whether the patient
population in the study is similar to the clinical patient or patient in the legal
trial.
135. Höfler, supra note 131, at 11.
136. Copeland, Supra note 124.
137. Id.
138. J. Andre Knottnerus & Jean W. Muris, Assessment of the Accuracy of Diagnostic Tests:
The Cross-Sectional Study, 56 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1118 (2003).
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The clinical relevance of a diagnostic test’s accuracy must always be
assessed. If the test result is highly accurate but the information does not
change patient outcome, then the increased accuracy may be irrelevant.
The reference test can be a source of bias. In “incorporation bias,” the
index test result is incorporated into the reference test. This can artificially
increase the accuracy of the index test. To avoid this, interpreters of the
reference test should be blinded to the result of the index test and vice versa.139
f. Sixth Level: Randomized Controlled Trials
In a randomized controlled trial (“RCT”), patients are randomly assigned
to the treatment group or the control group. Both groups are followed for a
pre-specified time period and analyzed in terms of a specific outcome at the
outset of the study. The randomization of patients reduces the risk of
selection bias.
Case-control and cohort studies are observational studies in the sense that
the researcher need not directly change the behavior of the participants. On
the other hand, a RCT does precisely determine the treatment plan/behavior
of its participants. This is advantageous in reducing bias, but it can also make
a RCT ethically problematic such as when assessing the toxicity of an agent,
such as smoking.
An RCT can also be prone to a number of biases. Selection bias can still
occur in a RCT if there is imperfect randomization or if there is a failure to
randomize all eligible patients. Performance bias is a systematic difference in
the care provided to the randomized groups, apart from the intervention
being studied. Exclusion bias is systematic differences in withdrawals from
the trial. Detection bias occurs in systematic differences of outcome
assessment, this is particularly common when there is a failure to blind the
assessors to the randomization status of patients.140 Another bias occurs when
those who fail to complete a clinical trial are ignored. In general, this bias
tends to be in favor of the intervention. For this reason, studies with a low
follow-up rate are generally considered untrustworthy and studies are
generally analyzed on an “intent-to-treat” basis.141 Although not a source of
bias, a limitation of a RCT can be the clinical relevance of the measured
outcome. The outcome being measured may be quantifiable, and thus easy
to study, but that does not mean that it has practical clinical value. Despite
139. Id.
140. TRISHA GREENHALGH, HOW
MEDICINE 50 (5th ed. 2014).
141. Id. at 56.
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these listed limitations, an RCT is favored over observational studies because
a properly performed RCT can eliminate many of the sources of potential
bias in research.
g. Highest Tier Evidence: Secondary Studies, Systematic Reviews,
and Meta-Analyses and Practice Guidelines
Primary research studies, such as observational studies and randomized
controlled trials, collect data on individual patients. Secondary studies, such
as meta-analyses and systematic reviews, aggregate information from
multiple primary studies. A systematic review begins by asking a well-defined
clinical question. Then a systematic search of the literature is performed,
using a well-defined and reproducible search strategy, to find all primary
research articles that ask the specified clinical question. The researcher then
closely scrutinizes the methods of the aggregated studies. If the methods fit
the strict and explicit criteria, then that study’s results need to be included in
the analysis, regardless of the results of that study. A meta-analysis begins
with a systematic review but then goes further by applying statistics to
quantify the results of the systematic review.
There are several advantages of a systematic review and a meta-analysis
over a primary study. First, by grouping smaller primary studies, a metaanalysis may change a trend found in the primary studies to a statistically
significant finding. Second, meta-analyses can help resolve contradictory
findings among the different primary studies. Finally, the results of a metaanalysis are more robust, more generalizable, and more likely to be true.142
However, meta-analyses/systematic reviews are not without weaknesses.
They can replicate and magnify flaws in the original primary studies.
Additionally, meta-analysis can yield false results if the underlying studies are
done on different patient populations or use different methodologies, which
frequently occurs.143
Medical societies create committees of respected physicians to review the
scientific literature and create evidence-based medicine practice
guidelines.144 These guidelines are published to assist practitioners in making
daily clinical decisions. Committee members who design the guidelines often

142. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED.
e124 (2005).
143. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 48 (Neb. 2009); Charles H.
Hennekens & David Demets, The Need for Large-Scale Randomized Evidence Without Undue
Emphasis on Small Trials, Meta-analyses, or Subgroup Analyses, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2361
(2009).
144. See Practice Management, Quality and Informatics, AM. COLL. OF RADIOLOGY,
http://www.acr.org/Quality-Safety (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
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debate at length about the wording of the guidelines. As a result, the final
publication often represents a compromise between differing physician
opinions.
Physicians and experts generally view practice guideline
recommendations as a high level of evidence, comparable to systematic
reviews and meta-analyses.145 For example, in Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v.
Dobbins,146 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in considering a malpractice
claim denying a causal theory of “maternal forces,” reversed a trial court’s
exclusion of a compendium of studies released in 2014 by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) on “Neonatal Brachial
Plexus Palsy” even though the purpose of the compendium was
[t]o review and summarize the current state of the scientific
knowledge, as set forth in the peer-reviewed and relevant
historical literature, about the mechanisms which may result in
neonatal brachial plexus palsy. The purpose of conducting such
review is to produce a report which will succinctly summarize the
relevant research on the pathophysiology of neonatal brachial
plexus palsy.147
But practice guidelines and systematic reviews are not infallible.
Unfortunately, studies have shown that some practice guidelines have serious
shortcomings.148 And at times practice guidelines held by differing medical
societies can have widely disparate recommendations despite the fact that the
differing recommendations from the societies are all based on the same
primary studies.149
h. Limitations of the Oxford Levels of Evidence
The Oxford Center does not intend for its ranking system to be the final
say in the assessment of the quality of a study. Exceptions exist where
research studies exceed or fall behind the expectations of the model of the
Levels of Evidence. Consequently, the use of this heuristic requires a “healthy
dose of skepticism and judgement . . . to appraise evidence and apply it to
145. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015
WL 9596321; Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS
1802 (2015).
146. Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).
147. Id. at 176.
148. Roberto Grilli et al., Practice Guidelines Developed by Specialty Societies: The Need for
a Critical Appraisal, 355 LANCET 103 (2000); Jonathan L. Mezrich & Charles S. Resnik, Panacea
or Sham? Legal Issues of Vertebroplasty, 13 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 663 (2016).
149. Id.
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individuals in routine practice.”150 This skepticism requires the clinician to
go beyond the Levels of Evidence analysis to delve into the details of the
methods and results of each research study.
III. APPLICATION
Apart from the ranking of levels of reliability for the various studies, there
remains the “fit” of the study to the “facts of the case.” This “fitness” issue is
often considered in the context of the “application” level of the analysis. The
courts often ask whether the expert’s opinion is an “unfair extrapolation”
from the studies being relied upon.
On the issue of factual application, the United States Supreme Court in
General Electric Co. v. Joiner151 explained:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.152
However, the Daubert analysis “is not intended to supplant the adversarial
process.”153 Even “shaky” expert testimony may be admitted if the Daubert
standard is satisfied, subject to cross-examination.154 More specifically,
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”155

150. Jeremy Howick et al., Explanation of the 2011 Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based
Medicine (OCEBM) Levels of Evidence (Background Document), OXFORD CTR. FOR EVIDENCEBASED MED. (May 1, 2016), https://www.cebm.net/index.aspx?o=5653.
151. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
152. Id. at 146.
We further hold that, because it was within the District Court’s discretion to
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied were not sufficient,
whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions that
Joiner’s exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony.
Id. at 146-47.
153. Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2011).
154. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (2010) (“Determination on admissibility should
not supplant the adversarial process; ‘shaky’ expert testimony may be admissible, assailable by
its opponents through cross-examination.”).
155. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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In Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins,156 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
adopted Daubert as the standard of admissibility for Wisconsin state courts.
157
Bayer, a medical malpractice case, provides a useful example. In Bayer, a
mother sued her obstetrician for medical malpractice claiming that his
negligence during delivery resulted in her baby having a permanent brachial
plexus injury.158 In defense, the obstetrician cited numerous scientific articles
supporting the expert’s opinion that it is more likely that maternal forces
caused the injury, not the physician’s actions.159 The trial court excluded the
defense’s use of the “maternal forces” literature claiming, “the problem that I
see with everything that is being done on this from the defense standpoint is
that these articles are not distinguishing between permanent brachial plexus
injuries and temporary brachial plexus injuries.”160 In essence, the court
excluded the compendium of research studies because the articles’ measured
outcome, of both permanent and temporary brachial plexus injuries, differed
from the patient’s measured outcome of only a permanent brachial plexus
injury.161 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because
“neither the Bayers nor the circuit court have explained why the defense
experts should not be permitted to extrapolate from the multiple peerreviewed articles that, while supporting the maternal forces theory for
causation, fail to distinguish between temporary and permanent brachial
plexus injuries.”162
Bayer suggests that if a study follows proper protocol then the courts
should permit an expert to extrapolate from the scientific literature to the
facts of the case. The level of “unfair extrapolation” will always be a Daubert
“application” question, but courts are less likely to exclude such evidence if
the underlying principles and methodologies of the studies are reliable and
the experts can explain the relevancy of any differences in “fitness” of the
facts.

156. Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).
157. Id. at 180.
158. Id. at 175.
159. Id. at 180 (“Dobbins cited over twenty peer-reviewed publications supporting his
claim that maternal forces of labor caused Unity's injury.”).
160. Id. at 178.
161. See id. at 182-84.
162. Bayer, 885 N.W.2d at 182.
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A. Evidence-Based Subjects for Cross-Examination of the Expert Beyond the
Pyramid Ranking of the Studies
1. Bias and Statistical Error in the Medical Literature
Unfortunately, it is well established that bias and statistical error result in
a high percentage of false results in medical literature.163 This question of
potential research errors should be queried whenever any peer-reviewed
study is relied upon by an expert when giving expert testimony. A few
corollaries exist to predict the truthfulness of an article.164 In general, the
greater the financial interests, other interests, and prejudices in a scientific
field, the less likely the research findings are to be true. For example, studies
performed by drug manufacturers on their own drugs are less likely to be true
due to financial bias. But bias need not just be financial. Some scientists bias
their results to obtain public acclaim or to acquire tenure. In “scientific bias,”
researchers alter the results to reinforce the prevailing scientific theory. These
biases need not be either conscious or intentional to be a source of unreliable
evidence.165
Even assuming the absence of any bias, research studies can be false simply
because of statistical mishaps. These statistical mishaps occur more
frequently when the studies are smaller, when the studied effect size is
smaller, or when a study reveals an unexpected result.166 Because of the
susceptibility to error, the scientific literature needs to be critiqued before
being used by a physician or before it is relied upon in expert testimony.
2. Critique Based upon a Study Using Journal Quality and StudyType: Ranking Scientific Journals
Not all peer-reviewed research is equally reliable. Consequently,
physicians and expert witnesses need to have techniques to sift out weak
studies. One way to start this literature critique is to start with the medical
journal quality. Journal quality can be measured using impact factors. An
impact factor is a number that reflects the average number of times a
particular journal has been cited by other journals. A higher impact factor
means more citations and, presumably means, a greater likelihood of
163. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings are False, 2 PLOS MED.
e124 (2005); M. Carrington Reid et al., Use of Methodological Standards in Diagnostic Test
Research. Getting Better but Still Not Good., 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 645 (1995); Anne W.S.
Rutjes et al., Evidence of Bias and Variation in Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 174 CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N J. 469 (2006).
164. Ioannidis, supra note 163, at e124.
165. Id.
166. Id. (The lower the pretest odds, the less likely it is to be true).
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scientific respect. One limitation of the impact factors is that a citation in a
low-ranking journal is given equal weight to a citation from a high-ranking
journal. The Eigenfactor value overcomes this limitation by giving weight to
citations that come from highly rated journals.167 A journal may be ranked
under the Eigenfactor by researching EIGENFACTOR.org. The online
SCImago journal rank168 is an example of rating journals by Eigenfactor. If a
witness relies upon a study, counsel for either the proponent or opponent
should review the Eigenfactor to credit or discredit any reliance given to the
study in the expert’s opinion. While the quality of a scientific journal is
relevant in the assessment of a given research article, this ranking is not
determinative. There are countless examples of incorrect research results in
highly esteemed journals, and there are many great articles published in
lesser known journals.
3. Critiquing the Details of a Study’s Methodology
a. Flow diagrams
After critiquing a study based on general features, such as its ranking
within Oxford’s Level of Evidence, potential bias, and the ranking of the
journal of origin, the expert needs to review and potentially critique the
detailed methods of the study. Reading the methods section of papers can be
confusing, even for experts. To simplify this process, readers are encouraged
to create flow diagrams. These diagrams create a visual aid that breaks down
the methods of a study into many different steps.169 These diagrams can be a
useful aid for physicians, expert witnesses, judges, and juries as they all seek
to understand the detailed methods of a research study.
These flow diagrams are best explained by example. Here is an example of
a flow diagram, created by the QUADAS group, of a cohort study that sought
to determine whether B-type natriuretic peptide levels could be utilized to
diagnose heart failure:170

167. Carl T. Bergstrom et al., The Eigenfactor™ Metrics, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11433 (2008).
168. SCImago Journal Rank, SCIMAGO, http://www.scimagojr.com (last visited Nov. 28,
2018).
169. Penny F. Whiting et al., QUADAS-2: A Revised Tool for the Quality Assessment of
Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 529 (2011).
170. Id.; Helen E. Smith et al., Biochemical Diagnosis of Ventricular Dysfunction in Elderly
Patients in General Practice: Observational Study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 906 (2000).
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Here is an example flow diagram created by the STARD group for
diagnostic studies:171

171. Patrick M. Bossuyt et al., The STARD Statement for Reporting Studies of Diagnostic
Accuracy: Explanation and Elaboration, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. W1 (2003). Patrick M.
Bossuyt et al. for the STARD Group, STARD 2015: An Updated List of Essential Items for
Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, BRITISH MED. J. (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4623764/.
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Flow diagrams can also be created for systematic reviews and metaanalyses:172

b. Challenging the methods (CASP)
After creating a flow-diagram of a study, the physician or witness is now
ready to critically challenge the details of the study’s methodology.
Standardized techniques have been developed to analyze the methods of a
study.173 One of these methods is the Critical Appraisal Skills Program

172. David Moher et al., Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and MetaAnalyses: The PRISMA Statement, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 264 (2009).
173. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802
(2015); Penny F. Whiting et al., QUADAS-2: A Revised Tool for the Quality Assessment of
Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 529 (2011).
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(“CASP”).174 CASP directs the reader to ask pointed questions of the study in
assessing for bias and applicability. CASP has different questionnaires for
each of the types of studies discussed previously. CASP also has a few
questionnaires for study types that we have not discussed, such as qualitative
studies. A physician, expert witness, or lawyer can use the CASP
questionnaires to better form their opinion about the biases of the study and
the potential applicability of the study in their specific clinical situation.
c. Understanding and critiquing research statistics: comparing
two groups to determine any statistical difference
(1) Null hypothesis
A “null hypothesis” states that two measured populations have no
statistically significant difference.175 To use smoking and lung cancer as an
example, a null hypothesis would state that the incidence of lung cancer is
the same in those who smoke compared to those who do not smoke. If the
lung cancer study reveals a statistically significant difference between the
groups, then the null hypothesis would be rejected and the conclusion would
be that there is a correlation between smoking and lung cancer.
(2) P-value
A p-value quantifies the likelihood that there is a statistically significant
difference between the two groups compared in the null hypothesis. If a pvalue is .01 then there is a 99% probability that the null hypothesis is false.
Conversely, if a p-value has a 5% chance that the null hypothesis is false, then
there is a 95% probability that chance alone could account for the measured
differences between the groups. Scientists in general prefer to have a p-value
of less than .05 before saying that a study reveals a statistically significant
likelihood of the null hypothesis being false. If the p-value is greater than .05
then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
(3) Type 1 error
A “type 1” error occurs when a study rejects a true null hypothesis.176 Even
if all bias has been removed, a type 1 error can occur strictly out of chance
alone. For example, if a study rejects a null hypothesis based on a p-value of

174. CASP Checklists, CRITICAL APPRAISAL SKILLS PROGRAMME, https://casp-uk.net/casptools-checklists (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
175. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ET
AL., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 122 (2d ed. 2000); BRIAN EVERITT, THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS (1998).
176. ROBERT H. RIFFENBURGH, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE (3d ed. 2012).
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.05, then 5% of the time an error was made and the null hypothesis was
actually true. If the study has bias, and most studies do have some bias, then
the chance of a type 1 error can be greater.
(4) Type 2 error
A “type 2” error occurs when a study finds no difference between the
measured groups even though a real difference exists.177 Studies that do not
enroll enough patients are at risk for type 2 errors because the results may
not be strong enough to show a statistically significant result. Such studies
are said to be “underpowered.”178 Increasing the number of enrolled patients
decreases the risk of a type 2 error but also increases the cost of the study.
(5) Power calculation
A trial should be big enough to have a high chance of detecting, as
statistically significant, an effect if it exists. In other words, a trial should be
“powered” to reduce the possibility of a “type 2” error. This power calculation
can be performed before the study begins to measure the appropriate size of
the study. The power calculation depends on the expected level of difference
between the two groups that would constitute a clinically significant effect
and the mean/standard deviation of the principal outcome variable.
d. Using statistics to show association between an agent and
outcome
(1) Absolute risks and relative risks
The “absolute risk” is the probability of an event occurring in a given
patient population.179 The relative risk is calculated as the quotient of the
“absolute risk of the test group” divided by the “absolute risk of the control
group.” A relative risk of 1.00 means that the measured outcome is equally
prevalent in the test group as in the control group. A relative risk of 2.00
means that the measured outcome is twice as common in the test group as in
the control group.
Some courts use a relative risk of 2.00 as evidence that a particular
causative agent is more likely than not to have been the cause of the negative

177. Patrick M. Bossuyt et al., The STARD Statement for Reporting Studies of Diagnostic
Accuracy: Explanation and Elaboration, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. W1 (2003). Patrick M.
Bossuyt et al. for the STARD Group, STARD 2015: An Updated List of Essential Items for
Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, BRIT. MED. J. (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4623764/.
178. Id.
179. RIFFENBURGH, supra note 176.
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outcome.180 A relative risk of less than 2.00 can still be attributed to the
causative agent, but it is not more likely than not. However, using the 2.00
relative risk as a determinant factor does confuse the notion of general
causality and specific causality. A study showing a toxin causes cancer with a
relative risk of 1.8 reveals the general causality of that toxin. However, a given
patient may have a greater or lesser risk depending on that patient’s other
risk factors. An expert witness will be needed to extrapolate the specific
relative risk to the patient from the research study general causality relative
risk.
A few other terms are often used:
Relative Risk Reduction = 1 – Relative Risk
Absolute Risk Reduction = Absolute Risk of Therapy – Absolute Risk of
Control
Number Needed to Treat = 1 / Absolute Risk Reduction
(2) Odds ratio
An odds ratio (“OR”) is another measure of association between an
exposure and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will
occur given a particular exposure compared to the odds of the outcome
occurring in the absence of that exposure. The odds ratio can be calculated
from a 2 x 2 frequency table.

Exposure Status

+
OR = (A/C) / (B/D) = (A*D) / (B*C)

Outcome Status
+
A
C

B
D

If the OR equals one, then there is no association between the exposure
and the outcome. If the OR is greater than one, then the exposure is positively
associated, or correlates, with the outcome. If the OR is less than one, then
the exposure is negatively associated with the outcome.
Case-control studies use odds ratios instead of relative risk because relative
risk cannot be calculated in these studies. In case-control studies, the
prevalence of disease is unknown so absolute risks cannot be calculated.
(3) Confidence intervals
Confidence intervals describe a range of values in which the true value lies
within a certain degree of probability. In general, confidence intervals use a
180. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Neb. 2009).
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95% probability. This means that the chance that the true value lies within
the range specified by the confidence intervals is 95%. Odds ratios and
relative risks are often stated with confidence intervals. If the stated
confidence interval of an odds-ratio or a relative risk overlap with 1.00, then
there is no statistically significant correlation between the causative agent and
the outcome.
e. Using statistics to appraise diagnostic tests
Many different statistical terms are used to quantify the quality of a
diagnostic test. These terms are derived from a standard 2 x 2 table showing
the result of the index test on the left and the result of the reference test on
the top, as shown in the table below.181

Result of Index
Test

Test Positive
A+B
Test Negative
C+D

Result of Reference Test
Disease Positive Disease
A+C
Negative
B+D
True Positive
False Positive
A
B
False Negative
True Negative
C
D

From the above table, multiple important definitions emerge:
(1) True Positive, false positive, true negative, and false
negative
True positive, false positive, true negative, and false negative are
descriptive terms for a given test result.182 A test result is said to be a “true
positive” if the index test was positive and the disease was present. A test
result is a “false negative” if the index test result is negative but the disease is
present.
(2) Sensitivity and specificity
Sensitivity and specificity are numeric values describing the quality of a
test. Sensitivity is calculated as the quotient of true positive cases divided by
all patients with the disease: A/(A+C). A highly sensitive test is a good
screening test because it has a low false negative rate.
181. RIFFENBURGH, supra note 176.
182. Id.
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Specificity is calculated as the quotient of the true negative cases divided
by all patients without disease. A highly specific test is good at ruling out
disease because there are few false positive results.
Here are some related terms:
Positive predictive value: A/(A+B)
Negative predictive value: D/(C+D)
Accuracy: (A+D)/(A+B+C+D)
(3) Likelihood ratios
Likelihood ratios can be used on diagnostic tests to determine the
probability of disease. According to Bayes’ theorem, the odds that a patient
has a disease equals the pretest odds of disease multiplied by the test’s
likelihood ratio.183 Each test has two likelihood ratio values, one to be used in
the setting of a positive test result and the other to be used with a negative
test result. These likelihood ratio values can be calculated from a test’s
sensitivity and specificity.184
Likelihood ratio of a positive test: sensitivity / (1-specificity)
Likelihood ratio of a negative test: (1-sensitivity) / specificity
Let us say for example that the positive likelihood ratio of a test is 8.0 and
the pretest odds for disease is 1:3 (25% probability). If we perform the test
and the test is positive, then the post-test odds of disease is 8:3 (73%
probability). This calculation helps reveal the importance of knowing the
pretest odds of disease in interpreting the results of any diagnostic test.185
IV. CONCLUSION
In the early 1990’s both the courts and the medical profession began to be
concerned about investigating the reliability of expert opinions relied upon
in their different professions. The courts have addressed the problem by
adopting the Daubert standard of admissibility, but the courts have given
little guidance evaluating different levels of reliability of health-related
testimony under the broad Daubert standards. At the same time, the medical
profession has adopted the principles and methodology of “evidence-based
medicine” for teaching and practice guidelines for physicians and healthrelated professions.186 This paper recommends that legal practitioners
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802
(2015).
186. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the
Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992); see also Benjamin Djulbegovic &
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become more familiar with the techniques employed by evidence-based
medicine in the direct and cross-examination of experts in both healthrelated and analogous fields where both expert testimony and learned
treatises are relied upon in support of expert testimony.

Gordon Guyatt, Progress in Evidence-Based Medicine: A Quarter Century On, 390 LANCET 415
(2017).

